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STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION CERTIFIED 
This Court has accepted the following question for certification: 
"Whether provision of lower limits for underinsured motorist coverage than for 
liability coverage, properly complies with former Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b) 
and 31A-22-305(9)(g) (currently codified under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3)." 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; 
and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured 
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured 
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy. 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1, 
2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same 
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the 
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) (2001). A complete copy of this statute was attached 
to Plaintiffs brief as Addendum "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Carter and Glenada Iverson (the "Iversons") insured their automobile with 
Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") under the 
same policy from August 1981 through the date of the accident giving rise to the subject 
lawsuit. On several occasions subsequent to January 1, 2001, State Farm explained to the 
Iversons the costs and purposes of uninsured ("UM") and underinsured ("UIM") motorist 
coverage and invited them to purchase such coverage in an amount equal to the liability 
limits set forth under their Policy. Despite being so informed, the Iversons opted to 
maintain their UIM coverage at its existing limit. 
Plaintiff now seeks to revoke the Iversons' rejection of higher UIM limits on the 
basis that changes to that Policy after January 1, 2001, involving a substitution in vehicles 
and an update in State Farm's standard policy form, created a new policy, requiring a 
new offer of UIM coverage. The Iversons do not dispute that their coverage under the 
Policy remained in continuous force during that entire period. 
This matter is before this Court upon the Certification of Question of State Law by 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
The UM/UIM Notices 
On February 27, 2001, State Farm sent a renewal notice to the Iversons (R. at 
105), insureds for whom it had been providing automobile insurance coverage since 1981 
2 
under policy number 479 7848 (the "Policy"). (R. at 65, 68). That notice informed the 
Iversons of the costs and benefits associated with UM and UIM coverage and invited 
them to purchase such coverage at amounts greater than those which currently existed 
under their State Farm policy. (R. at 105, 145-46), Specifically, the renewal notice 
included the following language: 
Please read the enclosed insert titled IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES. 
If you want to increase your [UM or UIM] limits to equal your Bodily Injury 
Liability Coverage limits or $250,000/$500,000 (whichever is less), please contact 
your agent. 
(R. at 105). Along with that notice, State Farm included an insert which further 
expounded on UM/UIM coverage. (R. at 72). That insert stated as follows: 
Utah law requires that auto policyholders carry Uninsured Motor Vehicle 
(Coverage U) and Underinsured Motor Vehicle (Coverage W) with limits equal to 
the lesser of: 
1. the policyholder's Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits, or 
2. $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
However, you may, in writing, reject either Coverage U or Coverage W or select 
lower limits for either or both of these coverages. 
Coverage U provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is 
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has 
no liability insurance to compensate you for your bodily injuries. 
Coverage W provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is 
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has 
liability insurance, but not enough to compensate for your bodily injuries. 
3 
Your Bodily Injury Liability Coverage, Coverage U, and Coverage W limits are 
shown on your enclosed renewal notice. Following are the Coverage U and W 
limits available and the applicable premium for each. 
(R. at 145-46). The insert proceeded to list various UM/UIM limits and the corresponding 
premiums for each, then closed with the following notice: 
If you want to increase your Coverage U or Coverage W limits to equal your 
Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits (but not more than $250,000 per person 
and $500,000 per accident), or if you have any questions, please contact your State 
Farm agent. If you want to keep the limits you have, no action is needed. 
(R. at 146). 
State Farm included the same language and insert with its next renewal notice, 
dated August 27, 2001 (R. at 108), then again in three subsequent renewal notices, dated 
February 27, 2004, August 27, 2004, and February 27, 2005. (R. at 73, 121, 123, 126). 
And even on several occasions prior to 2001, State Farm had informed the Iversons of the 
purpose of UM/UIM coverage and offered them the opportunity to purchase it in higher 
amounts. (R. at 131-33). Despite being provided with those numerous opportunities to 
obtain greater UIM coverage, the Iversons took no action, thereby opting to maintain 
such coverage at the existing amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident. 
(R. at 87-126). 
The Accident and UIM Offer 
On July 4, 2005, the Iversons were killed in a head-on collision while traveling in 
their PT Cruiser. (R. at 149-50). Plaintiff subsequently made a claim for UIM benefits 
under the Iversons' Policy. (R. at 25, 31). Just one month after the accident, State Farm 
offered its UIM limits of $10,000 for Mr. Iverson and $10,000 for Mrs. Iverson, for a 
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total of $20,000. (R. at 152). However, Plaintiff has taken the position that State Farm 
was required to increase the Iversons' UIM limits to make them equal to the liability 
limits set forth under the Policy. (R. at 197-98). As such, Plaintiff rejected State Farm's 
repeated offers of the $20,000 limit (R. at 26, 31) and instead filed suit against State Farm 
on August 9, 2006, stating claims for breach of contract and bad faith. (R. at 49). 
The Policy 
As opposed to insurance policies offered by some other carriers, which cover 
multiple cars under the same policy, State Farm policies only cover a single vehicle on 
one policy. (R. at 87-126). The Policy language established that coverage would be 
provided for any car replacing the one previously insured under the policy, so long as 
State Farm is asked to insure it within thirty days of delivery and any additional premium 
amount is paid. (R. at 300). The Iversons replaced the vehicle covered under the Policy 
on several occasions. (R. at 90, 92, 119). The final replacement took place in April 
2003, when the Iversons requested that a 2001 PT Cruiser be substituted for the 1995 
Chevy van previously covered under the Policy. (R. at 78, 119, 143). 
In August 2001, State Farm made a periodic update to its standard policy form. 
(R. at 304). This policy form update made no substantive changes to the coverages 
provided to the Iversons under the Policy. (R. at 304; 3 5 5-407). * Such an update was 
anticipated by the language of the Policy itself, which explained that some changes would 
be made to the policy form over the life of the policy and specified that such changes 
1
 As discussed further below, the form update primarily incorporated minor changes 
which had previously been made by endorsement. (See Addendum "C".) 
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would not create a new policy. (R. at 374). Specifically, the Conditions section of the 
Policy states that the terms of the Policy may be changed by endorsement or by the 
revision of the policy form. (R. at 374). Furthermore, that section also specified that 
unless State Farm mailed the Iversons a "notice of cancellation or notice of our intention 
not to renew the policy," State Farm would continue to renew the policy upon payment of 
the renewal premium. (R. at 375). 
When State Farm made the above changes in vehicles and policy forms, the letter 
code found on the end of the Iversons' policy number changed to reflect the differences. 
(R. at 111, 119, 304). However, the base policy number, 479 7848, has remained the 
same throughout the life of the Policy. (R. at 70, 137-38, 295). Change codes are used 
by State Farm to identify which declarations are in effect and to track changes in an 
existing policy such as a change in vehicle. (R. at 294-95). After the Iversons substituted 
vehicles in 2003, State Farm issued a Declarations Page which documented the 
substitution and related change in letter code by informing the Iversons that the current 
Declarations Page had "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E". (R. at 259). 
Aside from those changes set forth above, the only other differences in the Policy 
subsequent to January 1, 2001 were slight variations in premiums from one policy period 
to the next. (R. at 103-26). Such changes in pricing are not handled through State 
Farm's underwriting department, as premiums are set by actuaries in State Farm's 
corporate headquarters. (R. at 70). When discussing the difference between 
underwriting and pricing, State Farm representative Tammy Chase testified as follows: 
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Underwriting takes into consideration eligibility guidelines, what 
your driving record's like, things like that. The actual rating of the 
policy then, the price you're going to charge, can depend on who's 
driving the car, what coverages you choose, where that car is 
garaged, the territory, things like that. The classification how that car 
is used. 
So there's a difference in being eligible and underwriting for 
coverage for acceptability for eligibility and then choosing what — 
determining what rate is appropriate then for that risk, that 
underwriting risk that's presented. 
(R. at 68). She further testified that "[t]here are two separate functions. Underwriting 
eligibility and then rating. They're two separate functions." (R. at 70). She also clearly 
indicated that "underwriting has nothing to do with setting a premium amount" (R. at 71), 
and that a change in vehicles changes the pricing of the risk, but not necessarily the 
underwriting. (R. at 68). Although Ms. Chase did indicate that a material change to the 
Policy could potentially impact pricing, at no point did she state that any change in 
pricing was material. (R. at 254-55). 
Except for the minor ones detailed above, there were no changes to the Policy on 
or after January 1, 2001. (R. at 103-26). The coverage limits in place on the Policy prior 
to January 1, 2001 remained the same through the end of the Policy. (R. at 103-26). 
Furthermore, there was no change in drivers listed under the Policy from 2001 on, and 
Carter Iverson was the only named insured under the Policy during its entire duration. 
(R. at 103-26). The Iversons were never asked to complete another application once the 
Policy was initially obtained and there were no additional insureds added to the Policy 
after January 1, 2001. (R. at 103-26). 
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Insureds benefit greatly from the existence of a continuous policy. (R. at 70, 75). 
First, they are not required to repeat the application process, as they are when they obtain 
a new policy. (R. at 70, 75). Furthermore, they are able to maintain time accrued toward 
any discounts. (R. at 70, 75). For instance, State Farm provides a discount for policies 
remaining in force and accident-free for at least three years. (R. at 106). The longer the 
policy remains in force and accident-free, the greater the discount. (R. at 106). The 
Iversons benefited from such a discount. (R. at 105-26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9), an insurer is only required to obtain 
a written UIM election/waiver from an insured on new policies written on or after 
January 1, 2001. The statute does not define the term "new policies", but courts 
interpreting that term have held that an existing policy is only converted into a new 
policy if it undergoes some sort of significant change that alters the nature of the risk 
covered under the policy. 
State Farm issued its policy to the Iversons long before January 1, 2001, and no 
material changes were made after that date which would convert it into a new policy. 
There was no change in policy limits, nor did the Iversons complete a new application. 
At no time was the number of vehicles insured under the policy increased, and there were 
no additional insureds added to the policy. The only changes involved the substitution of 
one vehicle for another and the updating of State Farm's standard policy form. Courts 
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have widely held that such changes are not material and therefore do not create a new 
policy. 
Inasmuch as the Iversons' policy existed prior to January 1, 2001, State Farm was 
required to include in its first two renewal notices an explanation of the costs associated 
with UIM coverage, along with the purposes of such coverage. State Farm did just that, 
and then went on to include the explanation in three additional renewal notices. 
The purpose of § 31A-22-305(9) is to ensure that insureds are adequately informed 
with regard to UIM coverage. State Farm made every effort to comply with its 
obligations under that statute, and the legislative intent was fulfilled in this instance, as 
the Iversons were thoroughly informed concerning UIM coverage on numerous 
occasions. The Iversons were given multiple opportunities to increase their existing UIM 
coverage, but decided not to do so. Mandating a higher level of coverage despite that 
informed decision could potentially destroy, in large part, the benefits an insured enjoys 
from continuous coverage under a policy. 
ARGUMENT 
INASMUCH AS STATE FARM DID NOT WRITE A "NEW POLICY" TO 
THE IVERSONS ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001, IT FULFILLED ITS 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 31A-22-305(9) BY 
INFORMING THE IVERSONS OF THEIR OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO 
UIM COVERAGE THROUGH NUMEROUS RENEWAL NOTICES. 
In 2000, the Utah legislature enacted legislation intended to insure that insureds 
are aware of the purpose of UM/UIM as well as the various options associated with such 
coverage under their automobile policies of insurance. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9); General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, ^[11. That legislation 
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established two separate and distinct methods by which insureds were to be so informed, 
one method applicable to new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, and one 
applicable to policies in existence prior to that time. See id. 
Inasmuch as State Farm had issued Iversons policy long before January 1, 2001, it 
complied with the requirements applicable to existing policies by providing the required 
information in numerous renewal notices sent subsequent to January 1, 2001. Indeed, 
State Farm went beyond what was required in providing that information, and the 
Iversons were well-informed of their options with regard to UIM coverage. After being 
so informed, the Iversons made an educated decision to maintain their UIM coverage at 
its existing level, instead of increasing the coverage. As such, a greater level of coverage 
should not now be mandated, as so doing would create a substantial and unintended 
burden on insurers. 
A. A signed waiver of UIM coverage is only required on new policies 
written on or after January 1,2001. 
According to legislation passed in 2000, insurers must provide UIM coverage 
"equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits" available under the insured's policy on 
"new policies written on or after January 1, 2001 . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(b) (2001) (emphasis added.) The statute also permits insureds with such "new" 
policies to choose UIM coverage in lesser amounts should they not wish to pay the costs 
associated with coverage at greater amounts. An insured may purchase the lesser 
amount, or waive UIM coverage entirely, "by signing an acknowledgment form provided 
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by the insurer that: (i) waives the higher coverage; (ii) reasonably explains the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage; and (iii) discloses the additional premiums required to 
purchase underinsured motorist coverage" at the various limits. IcL 
B. State Farm did not write a new policy for the Iversons on or after 
January 1, 2001 because no material changes were made to the 
policy that was in existence prior to that date. 
The above requirements only apply to "new policies written on or after January 1, 
2001." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(b) (2001). Plaintiff does not dispute that the 
Iversons had a policy in place with State Farm on January 1, 2001. (See Plaintiffs Brief 
at 17.) Therefore, at issue is whether some change occurred to that policy, on or after 
January 1, 2001, which converted it into a "new policy." As set forth below, no such 
change occurred. 
The Utah legislature has not defined the term "new policy." However, the Tenth 
Circuit has noted that a new policy is created when there has been a material change to 
the type of risk insured by an existing policy. See May v. Naf 1 Union Fire Ins. Co., 84 
F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1996). A material change is one which alters the type of risk 
being covered. See Johnson v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98-4120, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 16049, at *21 (10th Cir. July 11, 2000). (Attached as Addendum "A".) In 
2
 Plaintiff spends a great deal of time discussing what are described as changes to the 
Iverson policy prior to January 1, 2001. Such changes are irrelevant as concerning the 
issue before this Court as Plaintiff recognized in her Summary of the Argument, in which 
she states that "the myriad changes and circumstances demonstrate that the Iverson's 
coverage changed materially after the legislature enacted a written waiver requirement." 
(See Plaintiffs Brief at 13.) As such, State Farm will focus its brief on those changes 
which took place subsequent to January 1, 2001. 
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the context of statutory UMAJIM selection/rejection requirements, "'[t]he determinant 
question is whether the change in the policy is material to the initial selection or waiver 
of UM coverage that would require the execution of a new selection or waiver.'" Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 490, 500 (Haw. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Lenard, 694 So. 
2d 574, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1997)). That change "must have a significant impact on the 
legal relationship and obligations between insurer and insured under the policy . . . ." Id. 
A substantial increase or decrease in coverage limits is widely considered to be 
one such material change. See e ^ May, 84 F.3d at 1346 ($2 million reduction in 
liability coverage constituted the issuance of a new policy as opposed to a renewal); 
Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 817 P.2d 841, 849 (Wash. 1991) (nothing that "where 
coverage levels remain constant, the majority of jurisdictions support the conclusion that 
no new policy is created"). Other potential material changes include increasing the 
number of insured vehicles or adding an additional insured to the policy. See Millet v. 
Imperial Fire and Cas. Ins., 887 So. 2d 603, 606 (La. Ct. App. 2004). Furthermore, 
courts will often consider whether a new application was completed in determining 
whether a new policy was issued. See e j ^ Chatlas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 892 N.E.2d 106, 
110 (111. App. Ct. 2008). 
No such changes occurred to the Iversons' Policy subsequent to January 1, 2001. 
The coverage limits set forth under the Policy remained the same that entire period. (R. 
at 103-26). The number of insured vehicles did not increase nor were any additional 
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insureds added to the Policy during that time. (R. at 103-26). And the Iversons were not 
required to complete a new application at any point. 
Plaintiff has essentially argued that a change in vehicles and in policy forms 
converted the prior policy into a new policy. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 16-17.) However, 
such changes are not considered material and therefore do not create a new policy. 
1. The replacement of a vehicle under an existing policy does not 
create a new policy. 
The replacement of a vehicle on an existing policy does not create a new policy. 
See Millet 887 So. 2d at 606-07; Dodd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 2004). Gasch v. Harris, 808 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 
Wells v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 185 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); 
Johnson, 817 P.2d at 849. Rather, the "mere substitution of automobiles with no 
additional changes in coverage constitutes the renewal of an existing policy." See Gasch, 
808 So. 2d at 1262 (emphasis added). By contrast, the addition of another vehicle to a 
policy, as opposed to the replacement of a vehicle, may create a new policy because the 
nature of the insured risk would be materially changed. See Dodd, 999 P.3d at 1223 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); but see Makela v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 497 N.E.2d 
483 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that even the addition of a new vehicle does not create a 
new policy). 
In Millet, the insured purchased UM coverage with limits lower than those 
applicable to his liability coverage. Millet, 887 So. 2d at 605. The insured subsequently 
replaced one of his vehicles with a newer model. After being involved in an accident 
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with the replacement vehicle, the insured claimed that he had intended to obtain UM 
coverage equal to his liability coverage at the time he replaced the vehicle on his policy. 
However, the court held that the replacement vehicle did not create a new policy. 
Therefore, the insurer had no obligation to provide a new UM selection form at that time. 
Id at 606-07. 
And in Johnson, the statute at issue established that the requirement of a written 
rejection of UIM coverage did not apply to renewal or replacement policies. Johnson, 
817 P.2d at 849. The court then went on to find that the replacement of an automobile 
under the policy at issue did not create a new policy, and that the existing UIM limits set 
forth under the policy applied because the statute did not "require insurers to reoffer full 
UIM coverage on renewal policies." Id. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish some of the cases set forth above based on slight 
differences between the governing statutes of those states and Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(b). (See Plaintiffs Brief at 21-22.) Some of those statutes do incorporate terms 
such as "renewal", "replacement", "reinstatement", "substitute", or "amended" in 
describing policies for which the obligation to obtain a written waiver of higher UIM 
coverage does not apply. Plaintiff argues that such language makes those statutes "much 
broader than Utah's - the Utah legislature chose to allow an exception to written waivers 
only for renewals . . .." (See Plaintiffs Brief at 21.) However, in making that contention 
Plaintiff misstates Section 31A-22-305(9). As set forth above, that section simply 
juxtaposes "new" policies with "existing" policies. By so doing, the legislature has 
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created a broad exception to written waivers, for if a policy does not qualify as a "new" 
policy, it must therefore be an "existing" policy. And the above cases are unanimous in 
holding that replacing a vehicle under an existing policy does not create a new policy. 
Furthermore, even if the Utah legislature had truly intended to only waive the 
written waiver requirement in strict renewal situations, the replacement of a vehicle under 
an existing policy is no more than a renewal of that policy. See Gasch, 808 So. 2d at 
1262; Johnson, 817 P.2d at 849. Indeed, the term "renewal" has been defined as "[t]he 
substitution of a new right or obligation for another of the same nature." Black's Law 
Dictionary 899 (6th ed. 1991). By replacing one vehicle under a policy with another, an 
insurer is doing nothing more than switching the same obligations from one vehicle to 
another, as opposed to assuming an additional risk. 
Plaintiff cites several cases in support of her argument that the mere 
replacement of a vehicle constitutes a material change in the policy. (See Plaintiffs Brief 
at 24-28.) However, upon close review, even those cases help establish that a change in 
vehicles, standing alone, does not create a new policy. First, in Withrow v. Pickard, 905 
P.2d 800 (Okla. 1995), the court found that the addition of a new vehicle to the policy, 
not the replacement of a vehicle, created a new policy. Importantly, that decision was 
based in part on Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673 (Okla. 1987). 
In Beauchamp, the insureds originally rejected UM coverage on a policy covering two 
vehicles. They later requested coverage for a third vehicle under the policy, and no UIM 
coverage was offered at that time. Id. at 674. In finding that the addition of a new 
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vehicle created a new policy, thereby mandating a new offer of UM coverage, the court 
reasoned that the "vehicle was not a substitute for one of those insured under the original 
policy." Rather, an additional vehicle was added, necessitating an additional premium. 
As such, the original policy had undergone a material change, as opposed to a renewal. 
Id. at 676. See also Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d at 500 (finding that as opposed to merely 
substituting vehicles, the insured added a vehicle, which led to an additional premium 
and the creation of a new policy). 
Plaintiffs other cases can also be distinguished because they involve situations in 
which in addition to replacing a vehicle, the policy underwent some sort of material 
change. See Whalev v. Allstate Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1023, 1026 (D.C. Del. 1984) (in 
addition to substitution of vehicles, a vehicle was also eliminated from the policy); Arms 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 360 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (also involved the 
addition of collision and comprehensive coverage); Folstad v. Farmers Ins., 210 N.W.2d 
238 (Minn. 1973) (adding a new driver to the policy made it more than a renewal). 
Furthermore, Arms, a case relied upon heavily by Plaintiff, has since been superseded by 
statute. See Matnev v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., No. 88C-AP-135, 1989 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 298, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 7, 1989). (Attached as Addendum "B".) As 
noted in Matney, Arms was decided under a previous statute which required carriers to 
reoffer UM coverage each time a vehicle was added or substituted on a policy. Id 
In 2003, the Iversons substituted a 2001 PT Cruiser for the Chevrolet that had 
previously been covered under the policy. (R. at 78, 119, 143). Under the case law set 
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forth above, such a substitution does not create a new policy. As opposed to the cases 
relied upon by Plaintiff, the Iversons did not add an additional vehicle to their existing 
policy, nor did they make any material changes to their policy. 
Considering a replacement vehicle to merely be an extension of an existing policy, 
as opposed to the creation of a new policy, is consistent with the contractual obligations 
imposed upon insurers in most policies. Such an obligation was recognized by the court 
in Wells. That case involved a "replacement vehicles" provision, which established that 
coverage would be provided for such a vehicle "provided it replaces the described 
automobile . . . and notice of its acquisition is given [to the insurer] within 30 days of the 
date of its delivery to such named insured . . .." Wells, 185 N.W.2d at 148. The court 
recognized that "[i]n extending the insurance coverage to the new automobile, the 
insurance company was merely providing the insureds with that which it had already 
bound itself to provide . . . . " Id. at 150. As such, the replacement of a vehicle under that 
policy did not create a new policy, and therefore a UM statute that had gone into effect 
subsequent to the original issuance of the policy did not come into play. Id. at 150; see 
also Makela, 497 N.E.2d at 488-89 (basing holding in part on the fact that the insurer 
"had contracted to insure any car on the declarations page, including any replacement, 
substitute, and additional cars .. . .") 
Just as in Wells and Makela, State Farm was only providing the coverage it had 
bound itself to provide when it replaced the Chevrolet with the PT Cruiser. The terms of 
the Iversons' policy established that coverage would be provided for any car replacing 
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the car that was previously insured under the Policy, so long as State Farm is asked to 
insure it within thirty days of delivery and any additional premium amount is paid. (R. at 
300). Furthermore, State Farm agreed to continue to renew the Policy, unless it provided 
the Iversons with a notice of cancellation. (R. at 375). Inasmuch as State Farm was 
simply complying with its obligations under the Policy by extending coverage to the PT 
Cruiser, such a substitution of vehicles does not create a new policy. 
Plaintiff also claims that a change in premiums, such as the one associated with 
the vehicle replacement, constitutes a material change. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 8-14, 29-
30.) That contention is based in large part on select portions of the testimony of State 
Farm representative Tammy Chase, which Plaintiff relies upon in an attempt to show that 
the rating process of a policy is a part of the underwriting process. (See id.) However, 
when Ms. Chase's testimony on this subject is viewed in its entirely, it is clear that 
underwriting and pricing are two separate processes. (R. at 68, 70-71). Indeed, when 
asked directly whether the rating of a vehicle was a part of the underwriting process, Ms. 
Chase indicated that "[tjhere are two separate functions. Underwriting eligibility and 
then rating. They're two separate functions." (R. at 70). She also clearly testified that 
"underwriting has nothing to do with setting a premium amount" (R. at 71), and that a 
change in vehicles changes the pricing of the risk, but not necessarily the underwriting. 
(R. at 68). And although Ms. Chase did indicate that a material change could potentially 
impact pricing, at no point did she state that any change in pricing was material. (R. at 
254-55). 
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More importantly, the courts have held that an increase in premiums does not 
equate to a material change because such an increase does not change the nature of the 
risk assumed by the insurer. See Johnson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16049, at *21; see also 
Gasch, 808 So.2d at 1262 (increased premium, which accompanied the replacement of a 
vehicle under the policy, did not create a new policy because the increase was not 
associated with a change in coverage). Therefore, even though the Iversons premium 
was increased when the PT Cruiser was substituted for the previous vehicle (R. at 116, 
119), that increase did not convert the Iversons' existing policy into a new policy. 
2. Periodic updates to a standard policy form do not create a new 
policy. 
In August 2001, State Farm updated its policy form. (R. 304). Such an update 
does not create a new policy. See Wells, 185 N.W.2d at 149-50 (finding that an update in 
a policy form did not create a new policy). It is common practice in the insurance 
industry for carriers to make periodic updates to their policy forms. Such updates are 
often made to clarify policy provisions or bring the policy in compliance with statutory 
amendments. Indeed, the Conditions section of the Iversons' Policy specifically 
contemplates that revisions to the Policy would be made over time. (R. at 374). 
Plaintiff has put forth great effort to find differences between State Farm's pre-
2001 policy form (the "previous form") and the form that was put into place in August 
2001 (the "subsequent form"). (See Plaintiffs Brief at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims that those 
differences have narrowed the coverages and substantially altered the Policy's terms. 
(See id. at 5.) Such was not the case, as set forth more fully below. 
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However, even if the changes could be construed as material, they did not convert 
the Iversons' existing policy into a new policy subsequent to January 1, 2001 because 
those changes were incorporated into the Policy by endorsement prior to that date. The 
subsequent form merely combined those changes with the remainder of the Policy. The 
adaptations pertaining to the bodily injury definition, motorcycle no-fault coverage, and 
the newly acquired car definition were originally set forth in Endorsement 6126FA. 
(Attached as part of Addendum "C".)3 Endorsement 6126FA was made effective August 
28, 2000. (R. at 103). The distinction with regard to the rental of business vehicles was 
originally established by way of Endorsement 6082P. (Attached as part of Addendum 
"C".) That Endorsement was effective with the March 30, 1994 policy period. (See 
Declarations Page, Attached as part of Addendum "C".)4 As such, the primary changes 
relied upon by Plaintiff were made prior to January 1, 2001 and therefore could not have 
created a new policy subsequent to that date. 
Furthermore, the differences cited are no more than minor variations, made for 
clarification purposes, or semantics. For instance, Plaintiff claims the subsequent form 
alters the definition of "bodily injury" by eliminating coverage for emotional distress 
which is unaccompanied by "physical bodily injury." (See id. at 5-6.) That definition 
merely offers further clarification of the definition set forth in the previous form, which 
3
 Endorsement 6126FA was not made part of the current record because Plaintiffs policy 
form argument was not raised in the underlying proceedings. However, it is the subject 
of State Farm's Motion to Supplement Record, filed concurrently herewith. 
4
 Endorsement 6082P and the March 30, 1994 Declarations Page are also subjects of 
State Farm's Motion to Supplement Record. 
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specifies that there is no coverage for "sickness" unless such sickness is attached to a 
bodily injury. (R. at 356). 
Plaintiff contends that the subsequent form also "redefin[es] the nature of 
coverage for rental vehicles" by excluding liability coverage for such vehicles when they 
are used in connection with an insured's business or employment. (See Plaintiffs Brief 
at 6.) However, under the previous form, coverage for a non-owned vehicle such as a 
business rental was only provided when that vehicle was rented or in the possession of 
the insured for less than twenty-one consecutive days. (R. at 356). Furthermore, such 
coverage was only available in excess of other liability coverage available on that 
vehicle. (R. at 361). Under then-existing Utah law, a rental company was obligated to 
provide renters with primary coverage meeting the requirements of Utah's financial 
responsibility laws, unless other valid or collectible insurance applied. See Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-22-314(l)(1999). Therefore, the only difference between the two forms with 
regard to coverage for rental vehicles was that under the previous form, excess coverage 
was provided for the short-term rental of a business vehicle, while under the subsequent 
form that coverage is not available. 
Plaintiff also argues that the subsequent form removes no-fault coverage for the 
occupation of a motorcycle. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.) However, under the previous 
form, the Iversons would not have had no-fault coverage for the operation of any 
motorcycle owned by them or a relative because no such vehicle was listed as insured 
under the policy. (R. at 363). As such, the only situation in which the Iversons would 
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have received no-fault motorcycle coverage under the previous form is one in which they 
were operating a motorcycle which happened to belong to someone other than themselves 
or a relative. 
And in some situations, the differences between the two forms relied upon by 
Plaintiff make no changes whatsoever. For instance, Plaintiff argues that the subsequent 
form eliminates the ability of an insured to recover attorney fees when they elect to 
arbitrate a dispute over no-fault benefits. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.) However, as 
recognized by Plaintiff, the previous form did not contain any language with regard to 
attorney fees in arbitration disputes. (R. at 363). Under Utah law, a party is only entitled 
to attorney fees in a contract claim if such fees are specifically permitted by contract or 
statute. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, p o , 84 P.3d 1154. 
Therefore, the subsequent form did not remove any right that existed under the previous 
form with regard to attorney fees. 
Plaintiff also contends that the subsequent form gives State Farm the "right to rely 
on mailing as sufficient proof of notice" of cancellation. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.) 
However, that same right was set forth under the previous form. (R. at 375). And finally, 
Plaintiff contends that the subsequent form is materially different from the previous form 
in that it now requires an insured to "ask" for coverage on a "newly acquired car" as 
opposed to "tell[ing]" State Farm about such a car. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6-7.) 
Although there is a technical distinction between "asking" someone to do something and 
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"telling" them to do something, the exchange of those two words does nothing to alter an 
insured's ability to obtain coverage on a "newly acquired car." 
Plaintiff has offered no case law which would suggest that any of the above minor 
changes to the policy form would be considered material. As discussed in Kaneshiro, 
"the determinant question is whether the change in the policy is material to the initial 
selection or waiver of [UIM] coverage . . .." See Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d at 500 (quoting 
Lewis, 694 So. 2d at 577). The changes set forth by Plaintiff certainly would not have 
caused the Iversons to rethink their selection of UIM coverage, nor could those changes 
be said to significantly affect the legal relationship between State Farm and the Iversons. 
The Iversons' Policy anticipated that some changes would be made to the policy 
form over the life of the policy, and specified that such changes would not create a new 
policy. (R. at 374). As set forth above, none of those changes altered the Policy in any 
material way. Therefore, as was the case in Wells, the mere existence of a new policy 
form does not create a new policy. 
3. An isolated phrase found on a declarations page or changes in the 
policy number's lettering do not convert an existing policy into a 
new policy. 
Plaintiff argues that a declarations page issued by State Farm includes a sentence 
indicating that the page "[Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (See Plaintiffs Brief 
at 15-18.) However, this phrase does not represent the establishment of a new policy. 
Rather, it refers to the replacement of the policy change code letter from an "E" to an 
"F". (R. at 259). Change codes are used to identify which declarations are in effect and 
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to track changes in an existing policy such as a change in vehicle or a change to the 
named insured. (R. at 294-95). 
It is ironic that Plaintiff contends State Farm's use of the word "replaced" operates 
to convert the policy into a new policy, and yet at the same time argues that State Farm 
should not have the "power to wholly dictate the characterization of its insurance without 
deference to the legislative requirements or the undisputed facts." (See Plaintiffs Brief 
at 17.) State Farm agrees that the Policy's status should be determined in light of the 
legal and factual issues set forth above, and that its use of a single word amongst 
numerous pages of policy documents does nothing to alter that status. 
Relatedly, slight variations to the lettering of the Iversons' policy number also do 
not indicate that a new policy was issued. The single-digit letter codes on the end of the 
Iversons' base policy number changed on two occasions subsequent to January 1, 2001. 
(R. at 111, 119, 304). As indicated above, these changes codes are used to track which 
declarations page is in effect under the Policy. (R. at 294-95). However, the testimony 
on the record is that the base policy number associated with the Policy, 479 7848, has 
remained the same throughout the life of the Policy. (R. at 70, 137-38, 295). 
Furthermore, even if the policy number had changed, such a change, standing on 
its own, is insufficient to create a new policy. See ej*. Chatlas, 892 N.E.2d at 110. Once 
again, to allow an insurer to dictate the characterization of a statute simply by changing a 
letter at the end of a policy number would cause great concern to insureds everywhere, 
who benefit greatly from the continuance of an existing policy. 
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In light of the above, it is clear that there was no material change made to the 
Iversons' policy on or after January 1, 2001. There was no change in coverage limits, no 
new application, no addition of a vehicle, or no other significant action during that time 
period which impacted the risk assumed by State Farm under the Iversons' policy. As 
such, there was no new policy written for the Iversons on or after January 1, 2001, and 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(b) therefore do not apply. 
C. State Farm complied with the requirements set forth under § 31A-
22-305(9)(g), pertaining to policies in existence on January 1, 2001, 
by sending the Iversons numerous renewal notices which informed 
them of their options with regard to UIM coverage. 
Inasmuch as the Iversons' State Farm policy was in existence prior to January 1, 
2001, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g)(i) governs. As set forth below, State Farm 
went above and beyond the requirements set forth under that statute. 
For policies existing prior to January 1, 2001, an insurer was required to include in 
its first two renewal notices sent after that date "an explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage . . . 
." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(g)(i). See also Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, 1f22 
(recognizing that the statute only requires "that a notice be sent to existing policyholders 
informing them of the opportunity to purchase additional [UIM] coverage . . .."). 
On January 1, 2001, the Iversons' Policy had UIM limits of $10,000 per person 
and $20,000 per accident. (R. at 103). For the first two policy periods after that date, 
State Farm sent the Iversons renewal notices which included the following language: 
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Please read the enclosed insert titled IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES. 
If you want to increase your [UM or UIM] limits to equal your Bodily Injury 
Liability Coverage limits or $250,000/$500,000 (whichever is less), please contact 
your agent. 
(R. at 105, 108). In the insert included along with the renewal notice, State Farm 
included the following information: 
Utah law requires that auto policyholders carry Uninsured Motor Vehicle 
(Coverage U) and Underinsured Motor Vehicle (Coverage W) with limits equal to 
the lesser of: 
1. the policyholder's Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits, or 
2. $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
However, you may, in writing, reject either Coverage U or Coverage W or select 
lower limits for either or both of these coverages. 
Coverage U provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is 
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has 
no liability insurance to compensate you for your bodily injuries. 
Coverage W provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is 
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has 
liability insurance, but not enough to compensate for your bodily injuries. 
Your Bodily Injury Liability Coverage, Coverage U, and Coverage W limits are 
shown on your enclosed renewal notice. Following are the Coverage U and W 
limits available and the applicable premium for each. 
(R. at 145-46). The insert proceeded to list various UM/UIM limits and the 
corresponding premiums for each. It also notified the Iversons that in order to increase 
their limits they should contact their agent, otherwise, the limits would remain the same. 
(R. at 145-46). 
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State Farm has verified that the above insert was included along with the February 
27, 2001 and August 27, 2001 renewal notices. (R. at 72). Those notices clearly explain 
"the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing 
the coverage . . .." See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(g)(i). Furthermore, State Farm 
went beyond the statutory mandate by including the same notice and inserts in three 
additional renewals. (R. at 73, 121, 123, 126). As such, State Farm has clearly complied 
with the requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(g)(i). 
D. The legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9) has 
been met in this instance because the Iversons were well-informed 
of the purposes and costs associated with various levels of UIM 
coverage. 
The purpose of the 2000 amendments to Section 31 A-22-305(9) was to ensure that 
consumers possessed adequate information about the options at their disposal with regard 
to UM and UIM coverage. See Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, Tjll. The statute was not 
intended to mandate a certain level of UM/UIM coverage for consumers, but to simply 
make them aware that greater levels of coverage may be available under their policies. 
See id. Those purposes have clearly been met in this instance. 
On five occasions, between February 27, 2001 and February 27, 2005, State Farm 
explained to the Iversons the protections which were afforded by UIM coverage. (R. at 
105, 108, 121, 123, 126, 145-46). On each of those occasions, they were told that they 
could purchase UIM coverage equal to their liability limits if they so desired. (R. at 105, 
108, 121, 123, 126, 145-46). Furthermore, they were made aware of the costs associated 
with those coverages and were told that if they took no action, their limits would remain 
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at their current levels. (R. at 145-46). And even on several occasions prior to 2001, State 
Farm had informed the Iversons of the purpose of UM/UIM coverage and offered them 
the opportunity to purchase it in higher amounts. (R. at 131-33). This is not a case of an 
insurer attempting to shirk its duties or to get away with providing a lesser coverage than 
it was obligated. It is clear that State Farm went to great lengths to comply with its 
statutory duty by ensuring that the Iversons were properly informed. The Iversons made 
an informed decision not to purchase UIM coverage in greater amounts, and such 
coverage should therefore not be mandated. 
Furthermore, to hold that a new policy is created every time a vehicle or booklet is 
changed under a policy would have an unintended and detrimental impact on insureds 
and insurers alike. First, insureds would lose those benefits associated with a continuous 
policy. For instance, every time a new policy is created, an insured must meet new 
underwriting eligibility guidelines, and time accrued toward accident-free or similar 
discounts would be lost. (R. at 70, 75). Plaintiff points out that a new policy might not 
always cost more than a renewal. (Plaintiffs Brief at 9.) While it is true that insureds 
may not always receive such benefits from a continuing policy, it is certain that they will 
never receive those benefits under a new policy. For instance, in order to receive an 
accident-free discount a policy must remain in force and accident-free for at least three 
years. (R. at 106). The longer the policy remains in force and accident-free, the greater 
the discount. (R. at 106). The Iversons benefited from such a discount for a number of 
years. (R. at 105-26). 
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Additionally, there are several disadvantages from a practical standpoint. If the 
replacement of a vehicle created a new policy, an insured would need to go through the 
application process every time they purchased a new vehicle. (R. at 70, 75). As such, 
they would be unable to drive away from the dealership knowing they were covered, as 
they can currently. And they would be required to expend the time and hassle of dealing 
with the paperwork, including the UM/UIM election/waiver form, every time a vehicle is 
replaced, a policy form is updated, a new policy number is issued, or a premium is 
increased. The legislature certainly did not intend such a result. 
As set forth above, State Farm has complied with the technical requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) and has fulfilled the legislature's intent behind that 
statute. The Iversons knowingly opted to maintain UIM coverage at a level lower than 
their bodily injury limits, and that decision should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should answer the certified question by finding 
that the lower limits of underinsured motorist coverage set forth under the Iversons' 
Policy were in compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b) and 31A-22-
305(9)(g) because that Policy was in existence prior to January 1, 2001. 
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OPINION 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
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and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judg-
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ment may be cited under the terms and conditions 
of 10th Or. R. 36.3. 
This case arises out of a dispute over insurance poli-
cies issued by Life Investors Insurance Company of 
America (Life Investors), and Monumental Life Insur-
ance Company (Monumental) in favor of Marvin John-
son, deceased. Life Investors and Monumental [*3] 
appeal the order of the district court granting summary 
judgment in favor of LaJuan Johnson and Steven John-
son, the plaintiffs and beneficiaries of insurance policies 
issued by the two insurance companies. LaJuan and Ste-
ven Johnson (the Johnsons) cross-appeal the denial of 
attorney fees. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Johnsons in their case against Monumen-
tal, affirm the denial of attorney fees to the Johnsons 
from Monumental, and reverse and remand the grant of 
summary judgment against Life Investors, and denial of 
attorney fees to the Johnsons from Life Investors, to the 
district court for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
For the purpose of ruling on the summary judgment 
motions, the district court relied on the following undis-
puted material facts. In February 1989, Mr. Johnson 
bought an accidental death policy from American Ex-
press Life Assurance Company (AMEX). In December 
1989, Mr. Johnson and his wife, LaJuan Johnson, com-
pleted a "request for increased benefits" form in response 
to a request they received from AMEX. In February [*4] 
1993, Life Investors assumed responsibility for the in-
surance policy issued by AMEX to Mr. Johnson. Also in 
1993, Mr. Johnson purchased a policy for accidental 
death insurance from Monumental, designating his wife, 
LaJuan, and his son, Steven, as beneficiaries. 
Years prior to his purchase of these policies, Mr. 
Johnson had been diagnosed with myotonic dystrophy, a 
form of muscular dystrophy. He received treatment for 
this disease until his death in 1995. Mr. Johnson devel-
oped muscle weakness as a result of the myotonic dy-
strophy. Although he remained relatively active, Mr. 
Johnson did occasionally stumble and fall down. In 
1991, Mr. Johnson fell down the stairs in his home and 
received treatment in the hospital for his injuries. 
On July 29, 1995, Mr. Johnson stumbled and fell 
while carrying a tray up the stairs in his home, causing a 
cervical neck fracture and a possible thoracic rib fracture. 
Mr. Johnson was admitted to the hospital in the early 
morning hours of July 30, 1995 and was treated for his 
injuries. On August 1, 1995, while still in the hospital, 
Mr. Johnson began to experience symptoms of pneumo-
nia. His doctor transferred him to the care of a pulmo-
nologist in the intensive [*5] care unit. Because Mr. 
Johnson began experiencing difficulty breathing, physi-
cians attempted to intubate him to clear his lungs. How-
ever, this proved extremely difficult due to his neck 
fracture. During the next day, it became apparent Mr. 
Johnson could no longer breathe on his own and would 
survive only with the assistance of long-term ventilatory 
support. On August 2, 1995, authorized hospital staff 
withdrew artificial life support measures and Mr. John-
son passed away. Dr. Edward Campbell filled out the 
death certificate and listed the immediate cause of death 
as pneumonia, due to or as a consequence of a cervical 
spine fracture, and the underlying cause of death as 
myotonic dystrophy. He identified the manner of death 
as an "Accident." 
Mrs. Johnson and Steven Johnson made claims un-
der the insurance policies following Mr. Johnson's death. 
Both insurance companies denied these claims, relying 
on language in their policies excluding death caused by 
sickness and defining an "injury" as a bodily injury 
caused by an accident "independent of all other causes." ' 
1 The relevant language in the Monumental 
policy is as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
INJURY means bodily injury 
caused by an accident. The acci-
dent must occur while the Covered 
Person's insurance is in force un-
der the Group Policy. The Injury 
must be the direct cause of the 
Loss and must be independent of 
all other causes. The Injury must 
not be caused by or contributed to 
by Sickness. 
EXCLUSIONS 
We will not pay a benefit for 
a loss which is caused by, results 
from, or [is] contributed to by: 
(5) Sickness or its medical or 
surgical treatment, including di-
agnosis .... 
The pertinent language from the Life Inves-
tors/AMEX policy is as follows: 
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Definitions 
"Injury" means bodily injury 
of a Covered Person which: 
1. is caused by an accident 
which occurs when the Covered 
Person's insurance is in force un-
der the Policy; and 
2. results in loss insured by 
the Policy; and 
3. creates loss due, directly 
and independently of all other 
causes, to such accidental bodily 
injury. 
General Exclusions 
The Policy does not insure for 
any loss resulting from any Injury 
caused or contributed to by, or as a 
consequence of... 
3. any sickness or infirmity 
unless the treatment of such is re-
quired as the direct result of an ac-
cidental bodily injury.... 
[*6] II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Following the insurance companies' denial of cov-
erage, the Johnsons filed suit in the district court, claim-
ing the companies breached their contracts. However, 
rather than making a determination on whether the com-
panies breached the contracts, the district court instead 
concluded the companies were estopped from relying on 
the sickness exclusions to deny coverage because the 
companies failed to disclose the sickness exclusions in 
the manner required by Utah insurance regulations. 
Consequently, the district court granted the Johnsons' 
motions for summary judgment in both cases, and denied 
the companies' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The district court also denied the Johnsons' request for 
attorney fees. 
Monumental and Life Investors now appeal the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment to the Johnsons 
and denial of their motions for summary judgment. Nei-
ther company denies it failed to disclose the sickness 
exclusion in the manner required by the regulation. 2 In-
stead, each argues the regulation is inapplicable to its 
policy. Monumental contends the disclosure obligations 
do not apply to accidental death policies. Life Investors 
concedes the [*7] disclosure regulation applies to acci-
dental death policies but contends the regulation is inap-
plicable to its policy because Utah adopted the rule after 
AMEX issued the original policy to Mr. Johnson. Both 
companies argue they are entitled to summary judgment 
because the Johnsons failed to show Mr. Johnson's death 
resulted from an accident and independently of all other 
causes. The Johnsons cross-appeal the denial of their 
request for attorney fees. 
2 The district court determined the language of 
the exclusionary provisions is buried in each pol-
icy and not in bold or color typeface as required 
by Utah's regulations. The court also concluded 
the exclusions do not clearly inform laymen as to 
what coverage exists. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUI-
REMENT TO THE POLICIES 
A. Standard of Review 
Because the district court's jurisdiction over this 
matter was based on diversity of citizenship, it was re-
quired to discern and apply the substantive law of Utah, 
the forum state, with the objective of reaching [*8] the 
same result as would a Utah court. See Brodie v. General 
Chem. Corp., 112 F3d 440, 442 (10th Cir. 1997). We 
review de novo the district court's determinations of the 
substantive law of Utah. See id. However, although the 
substantive law of Utah governs the analysis of the un-
derlying claim in this case, federal law controls the ulti-
mate procedural question - whether summary judgment 
is appropriate. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d 
782, 792 (10th Cir. 1997); May v. National Union Fire 
Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1996). "We re-
view the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 
the same standard as did the district court. Summary 
judgment is then appropriate if, after reviewing all of the 
evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the 
non-movant, no genuine issue of material fact survives to 
merit a trial." Chambers v. Colorado Dep't of Correc-
tions, 205 F3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Where, as here, the par-
ties file cross motions for summary judgment, we are 
entitled to assume that no evidence needs to be consi-
dered other than that filed [*9] by the parties, but sum-
mary judgment is nevertheless inappropriate if disputes 
remain as to material facts." James Barlow Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 132 F.3d 1316, 
1319 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1048, 140 
L. Ed. 2d 513, 118 S. Ct. 1364 (1998). "Where different 
ultimate inferences may properly be drawn, the case is 
not one for a summary judgment." Seamons v. Snow, 206 
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F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
B. Monumental 
We first address Monumental's argument the Utah 
disclosure regulation does not apply to its accidental 
death policy. The regulation at issue is found in the por-
tion of the Utah Administrative Code dealing with in-
surance administration, and entitled "Individual and 
Franchise Disability Insurance, Minimum Standards." 
Utah Admin. Code R590-126. The disclosure regulation 
provides: 
Accident-Only Disclosure. All acci-
dent-only policies shall contain a promi-
nent statement on the first page of the 
policy, or attached thereto, in either con-
trasting color or in boldface type at least 
equal to the size of type used for policy 
captions, as follows: [*10] "This is an 
accident-only policy, and it does not pay 
benefits for loss from sickness." 
Utah Admin. CodeR590-126-6G. The scope of Rule 590 
is described as follows: 
This rule shall apply to all individual 
and franchise disability insurance policies 
.... The rule shall apply only to coverage 
issued after the effective date of the rule. 
Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2B (emphasis added). Rule 
590 provides a list of definitions "in addition to the defi-
nitions of Sections 31A-1-301 and 31A-22-605(2), 
U.C.A. [the general provisions of the Utah Insurance 
Code]," which are to "apply for the purposes of this 
rule." Utah Admin. Code R590-126-3A. The term "disa-
bility insurance" is defined in the general provisions of 
the Utah Insurance Code as: 
insurance written to indemnify for 
losses and expenses resulting from acci-
dent or sickness, to provide payments to 
replace income lost from accident or 
sickness, and to pay for services resulting 
directly from accident or sickness, in-
cluding medical, surgical, hospital, and 
other ancillary expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(26) (Supp. 1996) (empha-
sis added). Monumental contends the term "disability 
insurance" [*11] as defined above, is too narrow to en-
compass an accidental death policy, and thereby argues 
the disclosure requirement contained in the regulation 
section entitled "disability insurance," does not apply to 
its policy. 
The Utah courts have never determined whether the 
rules set forth in the "Individual and Franchise Disability 
Insurance" section of the insurance code apply only to 
disability insurance policies or to other types of insur-
ance policies such as those addressing accidental death 
insurance. However, the general provisions of the Utah 
Insurance Code define "disability insurance" broadly to 
include insurance policies covering "losses" resulting 
from accident or sickness. See Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-1-301(26). Nothing in the regulations indicates that 
"losses" resulting from accident or sickness do not in-
clude death. Moreover, as the district court noted, the 
regulations dealing with "disability insurance" specifi-
cally mention policies providing for accidental death 
benefits in several subsections. 3 Thus, it is clear Utah 
implemented the "disability insurance" regulations with 
the intent to cover accidental death policies. Even though 
these regulations are not codified, [*12] in Utah, in-
surance regulations "passed pursuant to a statutory grant 
of authority have the full force and effect of law." Horton 
v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 842 P.2d 928, 932 n. 2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); see also V-l Oil 
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 904 P.2d 214, 
218-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Consequently, we con-
clude the mandatory disclosure provision contained in 
section R590-126-6G of the Utah Administrative Code 
applies to Monumental's accidental death policy. 
3 For example, the subsection entitled "Disa-
bility, Minimum Standards for Benefits," defines 
and sets the minimum standards for "Acci-
dent-Only Coverage" as follows: 
a policy of accident insurance 
which provides coverage, singly or 
in combination, for death, dis-
memberment, disability, or hospit-
al and medical care caused by ac-
cident. Accidental death and 
double dismemberment amounts 
under such a policy shall be at 
least $ 1,000 and a single dis-
memberment amount shall be at 
least $ 500. 
Utah Admin. Code R590-126-7H (emphasis 
added). Likewise, "Specified Accident Coverage" 
is defined as: 
an accident insurance policy 
which provides coverage for a 
specifically identified kind of ac-
cident (or accidents) for each per-
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son insured under the policy for 
accidental death or accidental 
death and dismemberment, com-
bined with a benefit amount not 
less than $ 1,000 for accidental 
death, $ 1,000 for double dis-
memberment and $ 500 for single 
dismemberment. 
Utah Admin. Code R590-126-7I(1) (emphasis 
added). 
[*13] Because Monumental's policy did not 
comply with the disclosure regulation when issued, we 
also conclude the district court applied the appropriate 
remedy by striking the exclusionary language of the pol-
icy. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 
668 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1983) (holding the insurance 
company was estopped as a matter of law from denying 
coverage under its policy due to its failure to comply 
with Utah insurance law). 4 See also Cullum v. Farmers 
Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922, 926-27 (Utah 1993) (conclud-
ing failure to comply with Utah insurance law rendered 
an exclusion provision in the insurance contract unen-
forceable). 5 As a result, under the circumstances pre-
sented, Monumental's claim Mr. Johnson's myotonic 
dystrophy caused or contributed to the fall which led to 
his death is irrelevant to our determination.6 Because no 
material, controverted facts are left for a jury to decide in 
Monumental's case, the district court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Johnsons. 
4 We reject Monumental's argument Martinez 
cannot apply because it involved an insurance 
company's failure to comply with Utah codified 
law as opposed to mere insurance regulations. In 
support of its argument, Monumental also con-
tends estoppel cannot apply to violation of an 
agency rule which it claims prohibits private re-
lief. Contrary to these contentions, nothing in 
Utah's insurance regulations prohibits private re-
lief. Given Utah's insurance regulations maintain 
the full force and effect of law, Horton, 842 P.2d 
at 932 n.2, we see no difference in whether Mo-
numental violated codified or regulatory provi-
sions. As a consequence, it follows that if the 
private remedy of estoppel is available for one, it 
is also available for the other. 
[*14] 
[*15] 
5 Monumental argues the district court erred by 
striking the language defining "injury" in its pol-
icy. Monumental argues the district court acted 
overzealously by striking this language as a con-
sequence of its violating the disclosure regula-
tion. Monumental also contends even if the dis-
trict court correctly determined its definition was 
more restrictive than allowed by Utah insurance 
regulations, the proper remedy would have been 
to substitute the statutory definition of "injury" 
provided in Utah Admin. Code 
R590-126-3A(l)(a). Monumental further argues 
even if the district court substituted the less re-
strictive language to define injury under the con-
tract, it still would not have been required to pay 
death benefits to the Johnsons. We disagree. 
The purpose of the disclosure regulation is to 
alert the insured to the sickness exclusion. See 
Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2A. It is nonsen-
sical to assert the insurer may violate the disclo-
sure regulation and be estopped from relying on 
the sickness exclusion, but then allow the insurer 
to nevertheless deny coverage based on other 
language in the policy which effectively excludes 
injuries allegedly resulting, in part, from sickness. 
Thus, we reject Monumental's argument it is en-
titled to summary judgment because myotonic 
dystrophy contributed to Mr. Johnson's death. 
6 Despite Monumental's contentions, the dis-
trict court's ruling did not turn the policy into a 
"disability" or "life insurance" policy. Rather, the 
district court recognized the policy extended only 
accidental death insurance, but under the cir-
cumstances, extended such coverage without de-
termining if an underlying illness caused the "ac-
cident," given the policy's failure to follow Utah's 
disclosure requirements. While Monumental ar-
gues the district court should have applied the 
exclusion and denied benefits under our holding 
in Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of 
America, 975 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1992), it 
misses the point. First, the district court never 
reached the issue on whether Winchester applied 
to this case given Monumental's failure to comply 
with Utah's disclosure requirements. Conse-
quently, even if we determined the exclusion 
adequately discloses that coverage does not ex-
tend to accidents resulting from pre-existing con-
ditions, Monumental nevertheless violated Utah's 
disclosure regulations by burying the disclosure 
in the policy and not setting it out in bold or co-
lored type. 
[* 16] D. Life Investors 
Life Investors asserts the disclosure regulation does 
not apply to its policy because AMEX issued the original 
policy before the disclosure regulation became effective. 
7
 The district court concluded Life Investors/AMEX sub-
jected itself to the provisions of the regulation by ac-
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cepting additional premiums for increased benefits after 
the effective date of the disclosure rule. 8 Life Investors 
argues the district court made this determination in error, 
and suggests the subsequent agreement did not constitute 
the formation of a wholly new contract that brought it 
under the auspices of the mandatory disclosure regula-
tion. 
7 As stated previously, Mr. Johnson bought the 
accidental death policy from AMEX in February 
1989. Utah enacted the Regulations at issue on 
June 20, 1989. Mr. Johnson increased his benefits 
in December 1989. In February 1993, Life In-
vestors assumed responsibility for the AMEX in-
surance policy. 
8 Life Investors points out the district court re-
lied on the wrong certificate when rendering its 
decision. This mistake arose from the confusion 
generated when, during discovery, Life Investors 
mistakenly produced a copy of a specimen certif-
icate which it did not send to the Johnsons. 
However, Life Investors drew the court's atten-
tion to this error in a motion to file a supplemen-
tal memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. The district court granted 
Life Investors' motion, and Life Investors subse-
quently filed a supplemental memorandum in 
support of its motion for summary judgment and 
attached the correct certificate. Although Life 
Investors maintains the district court committed 
plain error by relying on the incorrect certificate 
in rendering its decision, it contends the court 
would have reached the same decision even if it 
relied on the correct certificate, and asks us to re-
view the district court's decision as if it relied on 
the correct certificate. The district court reasoned 
the definition of a "covered injury" contained on 
page five of the wrong certificate acted as an ex-
clusion for sickness and struck the provision be-
cause it lacked bold-faced or colored type as re-
quired by the disclosure regulation. We agree the 
reasoning of the district court concerning the ap-
plicability of the disclosure regulation to Life In-
vestors' policy would have been the same whether 
it relied on the correct or incorrect certificate, and 
thus, in the interest of resolving this dispute, we 
review the district court's decision as if based on 
the correct certificate. 
[•17] 
Under Utah law, substantive statutes affecting 
vested rights do not apply retroactively. See Olsen v. 
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1998). However, because the Utah courts have never 
addressed whether an agreement to increase benefits in a 
life insurance contract creates a new policy, subject to 
statutes and regulations enacted after issuance of the 
original policy, we look to "other state court decisions, 
federal decisions, and the general weight and trend of 
authority" to determine how the Utah courts would re-
solve this issue. May, 84 F.3d at 1345 (quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Other courts, analyzing similar 
issues, have held an increase in premiums, benefits, or 
coverage, does not constitute the creation of a new cer-
tificate of insurance subject to regulations enacted after 
the original date the policy became effective. See, e.g., 
Gahn v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 926 F.2d 1449, 1456 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (applying Louisiana law and holding the 
modification of the terms of an insurance policy does not 
create a new policy); Metropolitan Property and Liabili-
ty Ins. Co. v. Gray, 446 So. 2d 216, 219-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984) [* 18] (holding the mere addition of another 
person on a policy does not amount to a reissuance of the 
policy and thus, does not make the policy subject to sta-
tutes effective after the issuance of the original policy); 
Crow v. Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co., 119 N.M. 452, 
891 P.2d 1206, 1211 (N.M. 1995) (construing the insur-
ance policy and rider as part of same contract for insur-
ance); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 15 
A.D.2d242, 222N.Y.S.2d339, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) 
(determining a rider attached to the face of a policy con-
taining an option for extended benefits on the payment of 
additional premium merely amounts to an extended pri-
vilege and does not create a new policy); Hidary v. 
Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 155 Misc. 2d 993, 591 N.Y.S2d 
706, 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding increases in face 
amount of coverage for payment of additional premiums 
did not constitute separate new policies); French v. In-
surance Co. ofN Am., 591 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979) (reasoning the addition of a car to in-
surance policy did not create a new policy subject to a 
statute which became effective after the issuance [*19] 
of the original policy). We can see no reason why Utah 
would depart from the majority view on this point of law. 
Nevertheless, we turn to the Johnsons' argument the in-
crease in benefits amounted to new "coverage" and thus, 
became subject to the disclosure regulation. 
In support of their argument Life Investors became 
subject to the disclosure regulation when it accepted the 
Johnsons' additional premium payment after the disclo-
sure regulation became effective, the Johnsons focus on 
the word "coverage" and point out the disability insur-
ance rules "apply only to coverage issued after the effec-
tive date of the rule." Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2B 
(emphasis added). In applying this provision to their 
policy, the Johnsons point out AMEX sent them a letter 
after it received the additional premium payment stating: 
I have enclosed your revised Data Page 
for your Certificate APG1000984 which 
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reflects your increase in coverage. Please 
replace the original Data Page with this 
new one. 
Your new quarterly premium will be 
$ 82.32. A charge of $ 56.95 has been 
placed on your American Express Card 
account. This represents the difference in 
premium due for your additional cover-
age. [*20] 
(Emphasis added.) Based on this language, the Johnsons 
maintain that by increasing the benefits under the policy, 
AMEX issued new "coverage" after the effective date of 
the disclosure regulation, making Life Investors subject 
to the disclosure regulation. We disagree. 
The term "coverage" when used in the context of an 
insurance contract is widely held to mean "inclusion of a 
risk under an insurance policy; the risks within the scope 
of an insurance policy." Black's Law Dictionary 372 (7th 
ed. 1999). See Traders State Bank v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 448 F.2d 280, 283 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The word 
coverage is, indeed, a term of art in the insurance indus-
try, meaning the sum of all the risks assumed under the 
policy.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 993 F.2d 313, 
315 (2d Cir. 1993); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bayside 
Resort, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (V.I. 1986); Illinois 
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 267 III. App. 3d 245, 642 
N.E.2d 159, 163, 204 III. Dec. 697 (III. App. Ct. 1994); 
Delcampo v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting 
Ass'n, 266 N.J. Super. 687, 630 A.2d 415, 422 (N.J Su-
per. Ct. Law Div. 1993); [*21] Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Washington v. Fredericks on, 81 Wn. App. 319, 914 P.2d 
138, 140 (Wash. Ct App. 1996). On the other hand, the 
term "benefit" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: 
"Financial assistance that is received from an employer, 
insurance, or a public program (such as social security) 
in time of sickness, disability, or unemployment." 
Black's Law Dictionary 151 (7th. ed. 1999). See Vogelv. 
Wells, 57 Ohio St. 3d 91, 566 NE.2d 154, 161 (Ohio 
1991) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary to define "bene-
fit"); Kratz v. Kratz, 905 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla. 1995) 
(relying on Black's Law Dictionary to define "benefit" in 
the context of an insurance contract). 
Hence, neither definition persuades us an increase in 
"benefits" alone increases the "coverage" or assumed 
risks of an insurance contract, thereby creating a new or 
different contract or policy. Under the circumstances 
presented we conclude the increase in premiums and 
benefits did not change the nature of the coverage or 
create a new policy subject to the disclosure regulation 
because it did not alter the type of risk Life Investors 
assumed under the policy - it only altered the [*22] 
amount of the benefits Life Investors was obligated to 
pay in the event a legitimate claim arose under the poli-
cy. For these reasons, the district court erred by deter-
mining Life Investors was estopped as a matter of law 
from refusing to honor the Johnson's claim. We therefore 
remand to the district court for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion on the Johnsons' claims 
against Life Investors, including their breach of contract 
claim.9 
9 The Johnsons contend they are entitled to 
summary judgment even if the district court erred 
by determining Life Investors was estopped from 
relying on the sickness exclusion to deny cover-
age. In support, the Johnsons argue the majority 
of jurisdictions, examining language in insurance 
contracts similar to the exclusionary language 
contained in their policy, refused to allow the in-
surance companies to rely on such language to 
deny coverage unless the preexisting illness con-
stituted the "predominant cause" of the injury, or 
the preexisting illness "substantially contributed 
to the loss." In response, Life Investors argues the 
Utah Supreme Court would interpret the defini-
tion of "injury" in its policy to preclude coverage. 
Relying on Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. 
of America, 975 F2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1992), Life 
Investors urges us to reverse the district court's 
denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment 
and rule the Johnsons are not entitled to coverage 
under the policy as a matter of law because they 
cannot prove Mr. Johnson's death resulted direct-
ly from an accident, independent of all other 
causes. We leave the determination of this issue 
to the district court on remand. 
After filing their brief with this Court, the 
Johnsons filed a motion for us to certify this issue 
to the Utah Supreme Court, contending certifica-
tion is proper because the Utah courts have not 
yet determined "how, under state law, language 
limiting coverage under accidental death policies 
where an insured suffers a preexisting disease 
should be interpreted ...." Life Investors filed no 
response to the Johnsons' motion to certify, but in 
its opposition to the Johnsons' motion for certifi-
cation, Monumental argues this Court should in-
terpret the "direct cause of loss, independent of 
all other causes" language as allowing it to deny 
coverage based on Winchester and without re-
sorting to certification to the state court. We deny 
the Motion for Certification without reaching its 
merits, and decline addressing Monumental's mo-
tion in opposition, leaving the Johnsons free to 
reassert their motion to certify in the district court 
on remand. 
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[*23] IV. ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE 
Finally, we address the Johnsons' contention the dis-
trict court erred by denying them attorney fees. In a di-
versity suit, the issue of attorney fees is considered a 
substantive matter and is controlled by state law. Jones 
v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 757 (10th Or. 
2000). However, our standard of review is a matter of 
federal law and "we review a district court's award of 
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. The district court's 
factual findings are only reversed if clearly erroneous. 
Legal conclusions and statutory analysis are reviewed de 
novo." Parks v. American Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889, 
892 (10th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). 
In Utah, the general rule is attorney fees are reco-
verable only if provided for in a contract at issue or by 
statute. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 
791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, ex-
ceptions to this general rule exist. In an insurance con-
tract dispute where the insured sues the insurer for 
breach of contract, attorney fees may be recovered as 
consequential damages for either a breach of the express 
terms of the contract or for a breach [*24] of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Billings v. 
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996). 
A. Breach of the Express Terms of the Contract 
An insured may recover attorney fees as consequen-
tial damages for the breach of an express term in the in-
surance contract if the fees "were reasonably within the 
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the par-
ties at the time the contract was made." Billings, 918 
P.2d at 468 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, 
in order to recover attorney fees as consequential dam-
ages flowing from a breach of express terms in the con-
tracts, the Johnsons need to first show the companies 
breached the contracts. However, the district court never 
ruled on whether either company breached the express or 
implied terms of its contract. The district court instead 
found Monumental and Life Investors were estopped 
from relying on the sickness exclusions in their policies, 
and under the doctrine of estoppel, held the Johnsons 
could not recover attorney fees. 
Given our and the district court's holdings that Mo-
numental is estopped from denying coverage, we must 
examine the principles of estoppel [*25] to determine if 
attorney fees from Monumental are warranted in this 
case. To begin, estoppel does not operate to alter the 
terms of the contract as originally written. See Perkins v. 
Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1131 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Rather, estoppel is normally as-
serted as a defense to a claim or right and does not create 
an independent cause of action. See Raymond v. Halifax 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 466 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985); Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N. W.2d 352, 
357-58 (N.D. 1986); see also General Motors, 668 P.2d 
at 502 ("Although estoppel is usually a factual defense, it 
may be established as a matter of law to preclude an in-
surance company from relying on an exclusion in a credit 
life and accident policy."). Estoppel merely abates the 
insurer's right to defend against the insured's claim for 
breach of contract by relying on the language in its poli-
cy. See id. Moreover, unlike breach of contract where the 
award of attorney fees is reasonably contemplated at the 
time of the contract, Billings, 918 P. 2d at 468, estoppel 
is not an independent cause [*26] of action like breach 
of contract, or a circumstance in which attorney fees are 
ever contemplated. It is not the same as breach of con-
tract for the purpose of awarding attorney fees. 
In applying this conclusion to the facts of this case, 
we note neither we nor the district court ever reached the 
issue of whether Monumental breached its contract with 
the Johnsons when holding Monumental is estopped as a 
matter of law from relying on the sickness exclusion. 
Therefore, the Johnsons are not entitled to attorney fees 
from Monumental under the theory Monumental 
breached the express terms of the contract. However, 
because we are reversing and remanding the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the John-
sons on their claim against Life Investors, we leave the 
determinations of whether Life Investors breached the 
express terms of its contract, and whether the Johnsons 
are entitled to attorney fees under Utah law, to the dis-
trict court. 
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Johnsons alternatively assert an award of attor-
ney fees is proper because the companies breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 10 In 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
[*27] the Utah Supreme Court recognized attorney fees 
may be available as consequential damages flowing from 
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by an insurance company. Id. at 801. Under 
Beck, an insurer may be found to breach the implied co-
venant of good faith and fair dealing if it fails to dili-
gently investigate the facts underlying a claim, fairly 
evaluate the claim, or "act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim." Id. "The overriding re-
quirement imposed by the implied covenant is that in-
surers act reasonably ... in dealing with their insureds." 
Billings, 918 P. 2d at 465. However, "when an insured's 
claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate 
it and cannot be held to have breached the implied cove-
nant if it chooses to do so." Id. 
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10 The Johnsons assert because Life Investors 
did not answer their cross-appeal from the denial 
of attorney fees, it waived the issue. Although an 
appellant who chooses not to brief an issue may 
be deemed to waive the issue, see Sheets v. Salt 
Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1390 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 516 U.S. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 34, 116 
S. Ct. 74 (1995), this rule does not apply to ap-
pellees. The Johnsons, as the appellants, retain 
the burden to prove on appeal the trial court 
erred. If the insurance companies, as the appel-
lees, choose not to defend the trial court's deci-
sion, this does not relieve the Johnsons of their 
burden to convince us of the district court's er-
rors. 
[*28] The Johnsons contend "as a matter of law, 
the Companies could not have acted diligently, fairly or 
reasonably in rejecting the Johnsons' claims, as they vi-
olated applicable Utah Insurance Department Regula-
tions by which they were bound, and denied the claims in 
the face of the Regulations." However, they cite no case 
where failing to comply with insurance regulations has 
been found to be the equivalent of failing to fairly eva-
luate a claim or act promptly and reasonably in rejecting 
the claim. Nor are we persuaded by the Johnsons' argu-
ment. Monumental's contention the disclosure regulation 
did not apply to its contract is "fairly debatable" as the 
Utah courts have not ruled directly on the issue of 
whether the disability insurance regulations apply to ac-
cidental death policies. Obviously, because we agree 
with Life Investors that the regulation does not apply to 
its contract, we cannot hold Life Investors violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by asserting it is 
not estopped from relying on the sickness exclusion. 
However, on remand, the Johnsons might prove Life 
Investors breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing on other grounds and that they are entitled [*29] 
to attorney fees in accordance with Utah law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and applying the prin-
ciples for reviewing summary judgment determinations, 
we REVERSE the district court's order granting sum-
mary judgment to the Johnsons in their suit against Life 
Investors, and REMAND for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. As to the issue of attorney fees, 
we REVERSE and REMAND the district court's denial 
of attorney fees to the Johnsons from Life Investors for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 
AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Johnsons against Monumental and AF-
FIRM the denial of attorney fees to the Johnsons from 
Monumental. 
Entered by the Court: 
WADE BRORBY 
United States Circuit Judge 
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Plaintiffs Kathleen and Dan Matney have filed a motion 
for summary judgment, asking this Court to declare as a 
matter of law that they are entitled to unin-
sured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage up to a sin-
gle limit of $ 300,000. Defendant Nationwide Insurance 
Company has filed a cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, asserting that its liability in this claim is limited to 
$100,000. 
The Matneys initially insured a vehicle with Nation-
wide in March, 1984, which provided liability coverage 
in the amount of$ 25,000 per person, $ 50,000 per oc-
currence. UM coverage was in the same amounts. On 
June 11, 1984, the Matneys renewed their policy, in-
creasing their liability coverage to $ 300,000. They did 
not increase the $ 25,000/50,000 limit on their UM cov-
erage. At the time of that renewal, Mr. Matney executed 
a "Form A" document, which is a coverage election form 
required by Regulation No. 9 of the Insurance Commis-
sioner l which contains general [*2] information 
about automobile insurance and also provides spaces 
where the coverage selected by the insured is filled in. 
The form contained the following language2: 
1 The Insurance Commissioner is authorized 
under 18 Del.C. § 314(a) to "make reasonable 
rules and regulations necessary for or as an aid to 
the administration or effectuation of any provi-
sion of this title. 
2 The Form A issued by the Insurance Com-
missioner states that uninsured/underinsured ve-
hicle coverage is available in limits "up to the 
Bodily Injury Liability Limits or $ 
100,000/300,000 whichever is less." 'hat form, 
which is included in Defendant's Exhibit "A", 
was amended effective December 1, 1983. An 
April 23, 1980 version of the form reflects the $ 
300,000/300,000 limits found on the Nationwide 
form Mr. Matney signed on June 11, 1984. 
Another revision occurred April 10, 1987. 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage * 
(Optional) (Available in limits up to the Bodily In-
jury Liability Limits or $ 300,000/300,000 whichever is 
less) 
* Uninsured Motorists Coverage is not mandatory 
but it is required that the coverage be offered to all poli-
cyholders 
1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 298, * 
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There is an issue of fact as to whether the [*3] 
Matneys were informed of the cost of the varying 
amounts of UM coverage available. 
At the time the Form A was signed, the insurer was 
required to offer the UM option with each material 
change in the policy, which included adding a new ve-
hicle to the policy. Arms v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, Del. Super., 465 A.2d 360 
(1983), offd Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 1060 (1984). On July 
20, 1984, an amended version of 18 Del.C. § 3902 went 
into effect which relieved insurance carriers of the bur-
den of reoffering the UM option each time a vehicle is 
added or substituted. 
The Matneys subsequently had occasion to review 
their policy on four occasions. In March, 1985, they 
added a second car. The next month they renewed their 
policy. In June they replaced one car with a newer model 
and in September they did the same for their second car. 
All of these events occurred after the amended version of 
18 Del.C § 3902 went into effect, and no further Form A 
documents were executed by the Matneys. 
When it came time to renew the policy in Septem-
ber, 1986, Nationwide unilaterally raised the UM cover-
age on the Matney's vehicles to $ 100,000/300,000 split 
limits. The $ 300,000 [*4] single limit liability insur-
ance was unaffected by the change. Nationwide included 
a "stuffer message" with the renewal which included the 
following statements: 
With the enclosed renewal billing we have either 
added UMC coverage to your policy or increased your 
present limit on each vehicle to equal your present Bodi-
ly Injury coverage limits or the maximum limit permitted 
by Delaware law, whichever is less. 
— The maximum Uninsured Motorists Bodily Injury 
limit permitted by law is $ 100,000 per person, $ 300,000 
per accident. 
~ There will be no change in your present policy if 
your Bodily Injury and UMC Bodily Injuy limits are 
equal. 
~ Higher limits of Bodily Injury and UMC Bodily 
Injury coverage are available from your Nationwide 
Agent. 
You still have the option to select lower UMC Bo-
dily Injury limits or reject UMC coverage. 
If you have any questions concerning these changes 
in your policy limits, we urge you to contact your Na-
tionwide Agent. 
The Matneys took no action to reject the change in 
UM coverage. Mrs. Matney was subsequently injured in 
an automobile accident on January 2, 1987, by an unde-
rinsured motorist. 
The parties dispute whether Nationwide had a duty 
to [*5] offer the Matneys the option of increasing their 
UM limits when vehicles were added or substituted on 
their policy. Nationwide argues that the new legislation 
relieved them of that duty. The Matneys counter that 
argument by asserting that the amendment to 18 Del.C § 
3902(a) (1) was deemed not to apply retroactively to 
policies and renewals coming before July 20, 1984.3 
3 The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of 
this argument, Whaley v. Allstate, D. Del, 595 
F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (1984), and Ritter v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., D. Del, 633 F.Supp. 362, 367 
(198b) concern accidents which occurred prior to 
July 20, 1984, the effective date of the amend-
ment, a situation markedly different from the case 
at bar. 
It is unnecessary to resolve that particular dispute 
because, whether or not Nationwide was obliged to do 
so, it did, in fact, make an offer in September, 1986, to 
increase the UM coverage by way of the stuffer message 
coupled with the increased UM coverage. 
The Matneys accepted the offer by not requesting 
that the lower limits be reinstated and by paying the 
concomitant higher premiums. The effect of this accep-
tance was to alter the agreement reflected on Form [*6] 
A. 
Nationwide contends that the affirmative rejection of 
the $ 300,000 single limit UM coverage reflected in 
Form A is still operative today, notwithstanding the 
change in coverage due to Nationwide's initiative. Sec-
tion 3902(a)(1) reads as follows: 
(1) No such coverage shall be required in or sup-
plemental to a policy when rejected in writing, on a form 
furnished by the insurer or group of affiliated insurers 
describing the coverage being rejected, by an insured 
named therein, or upon any renewal of such policy or 
upon any reinstatement, substitution, amendment, altera-
tion, modification, transfer or replacement thereof by the 
same insurer unless the coverage is then requested in 
writing by the named insured.... 
Ordinarily, once an insured rejects in writing UM 
coverage he would otherwise be entitled to, he must 
make a written request to obtain that coverage at a later 
date 18 Del.C. § 3902(a)(1). No such request was made 
here. However, the stuffer message which accompanied 
the 1986 renewal contained a material misstatement of 
the law. 
Subsection (b) provides as follows: 
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(b) Every insurer shall offer to the insured the option 
to purchase additional coverage for personal [*7] in-
jury or death up to a limit of $ 100,000 per person and $ 
300,000 per accident or $ 300,000 single limit, but not to 
exceed the limits for bodily injury liability set forth in 
the basic policy. Such additional insurance shall include 
underinsured bodily injury liability coverage 
This subsection requires that the insurer offer UM 
coverage up to a $ 300,000 single limit to those insureds, 
like the Matneys, who carry that amount in liability in-
surance. Kulas v. Nationwide, Del. Super., C.A. No. 
87C-OC-87, Babiarz, J., (May 30, 1989). 
Although the Form A Mr. Matney signed on June 
11, 1984, makes reference to the availability of UM cov-
erage up to $ 300,000/300,000, the stuffer message 
misstates the law as follows: "The maximum Uninsured 
Motorists Bodily Injury limit permitted by law is $ 
100,000 per person, $ 300,000 per accident." In fact, 
Nationwide was obliged to offer the Matneys $ 300,000 
single limit coverage, see Kulas, supra, and was permit-
ted to offer even higher amounts. Nationwide in effect 
represented that the amount of coverage that they were 
now offering, which the Matneys accepted, was the 
maximum allowable by law. The Matneys could reason-
ably have understood [*8] that the $ 300,000/300,000 
coverage was no longer available. 
There is a dispute over whether the insureds' deci-
sion in choosing UM coverage was informed. The dis-
pute centers on whether a meaningful offer must include 
information about the cost of such insurance. See Morris 
v. Allstate, Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-OC-23 (Taylor, 
Judge) (July 10, 1984). I do not need to reach that issue 
because I find that the renewal offer made in this case 
was misleading and therefore not meaningful. Because 
Nationwide, at the time it induced the Matneys to reeva-
luate their UM coverage, suggested that $ 
300,000/300,000 limits were no longer available, there 
was no clear rejection of those limits. Nationwide cannot 
rely on the Form A rejection of the $ 300,000/300,000 
limits for two reasons. First, Regulation 9, Article 9(e), 
in effect when the form was signed, stated that the form 
"will remain in effect until modified by the insurance."4 
Since the Matneys have modified their UM coverage, it 
follows that the form, at least insofar as UM coverage is 
concerned, is no longer applicable. Second, the stuffer 
message suggested that the $ 300,000 single limit was no 
longer available as an option. Nationwide [*9] with-
drew that option at a time when it induced the Matneys 
to accept what was represented to be the maximum per-
mitted by law. Thus a rejection of what was in fact the 
maximum required to be offered, the $ 300,000 single 
limit, is far from clear. 
4 The provisions of article 9(e) are now found 
in article 11. The above-cited language is no 
longer incorporated into Regulation No. 9 See 
Regulation No. 9, Art. 11(a), revised May 16, 
1987 and December 31, 1987. 
Failure to offer the required coverage serves to ex-
tend a continuing offer of such coverage. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arms, Del Supr., 477 A.2d 1060 
(1984). Plaintiffs are now entitled to elect UM coverage 
up to the $ 300,000 single limit. 
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This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy 
remain the same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a 
different effective date is specified by us in writing 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed 
1. DEFINED WORDS 
a. The definition of bodily injury is changed 
to read. 
Bodily Injury - means physical bodily 
injury to a person and sickness, dis-
ease or death which results from it. A 
person does not sustain bodily injury 
if that person suffers emotional dis-
tress in the absence of physical bodily 
injury. 
b. The definition of newly acquired car is 
changed to read: 
Newly Acquired Car - means a replace-
ment car or an additional car. 
Replacement Car - means a car 
newly owned by or newly leased to 
you or your spouse that replaces your 
car. This policy will only provide 
coverage for the replacement car if 
you or your spouse. 
1 ask us to insure it within 30 
days after its delivery to you 
oi your spouse, and 
2. pay us any added amount 
due. 
Additional Car - means an added car 
newly owned by or newly leased to 
you or your spouse. This policy will 
only provide coverage for the addi-
tional car if. 
t. it is a private passenger car 
and we insure all other pri-
vate passenger cars\ or 
2. it is other than a private pas* 
senger car and we insure all 
cars 
owned by or leased to you or your 
spouse on the date of its delivery to 
you or your spouse 
This policy provides coverage for the 
additional car only until the earlier of: 
1 12-01 A.M Standard Time at 
the address shown on the 
declarations page on the 31st 
that your policy is changed as follows: 
day after the delivery of the 
car to you or your spouse, or 
2. the effective date and time of 
a policy issued by us or any 
other company that describes 
the car on its declarations 
You or your spouse may apply for a 
policy that will provide coverage be-
yond the 30th day for the additional 
car Such policy will be issued only if 
both the applicant and the vehicle are 
eligible for coverage at the time of 
application 
If a newly acquired car is not otherwise 
afforded comprehensive or collision cov-
erage by this or any other policy, this pol-
icy will provide the comprehensive or 
collision coverage not otherwise provided 
for the newly acquired car. If such cover-
age is provided by this paragraph, it will 
apply only umil 12 01 A.M. Standard 
Time at the address shown on the declara-
tions page on the sixth day after the deliv-
ery of the car to you or your spouse Any 
comprehensive or collision coverage pro-
vided by this paragraph is subject to a de-
ductible of5500 
c. The definition of relative is changed to 
read-
Relative - means a person related to 
you or your spouse by blood, mar-
riage, adoption or guardianship who 
resides with you, including those who 
usually make their home in your 
household but temporarily live else-
where 
d The definition of spouse is changed to 
read: 
Spouse - means vour husband or 
wife who resides with you. 
2. SECTION I — LIABILITY — COVER-
AGE A 
a. The third paragraph is changed to read 
In addition to the limits of liability, we 
will pay for an insured any costs 
6126FA 
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listed below resulting from such acci-
dent. 
L Court costs of any suit for 
damages that we defend. 
2. Interest on damages owed by 
the insured due to a judg-
ment and accruing: 
a. after the judgment, and 
until we pay, offer or de-
posit in court the amount 
due under this coverage; 
or 
b. before the judgment, 
where owed by law, and 
until we pay, offer or de-
posit in court the amount 
due under this coverage, 
but only on mat part of 
the judgment we pay. 
3. Premiums or costs of bonds: 
a. to secure the release of 
sto tasurt&*s property 
attached under a court 
order; 
b. required to appeal a de-
cision in a suit for dam-
ages if we have not paid 
our limit of liability that 
applies to the suit; and 
c. up to $250 for each bail 
bond needed because of 
an accident or related 
traffic law violation. 
We have no duty to furnish 
or apply for any bonds. The 
amount of any bond we pay 
for shall not be more than our 
limit of liability. 
4. Expenses incurred by an in-
sured; 
a. far loss of wages or sal-
ary up to $100 per day if 
we ask the insured to 
attend the trial of a civil 
suit 
b. for first aid to others at 
the time of the accident. 
c. at our request 
>>. Ttot provision ti\\to liaSVtr Coverage » 
changed to read: 
Trailer Coverage 
The HabWfy coverage extends to the own-
ership maintenance or use, by an insured, 
of: 
1 trailers designed to be pulled by a 
private passenger car or a utility 
vehicle, except those trailers in 
2.a. below. 
Farm implements and farm wag-
ons are considered trailers while 
pulled on public roads by a car 
we insure For liability. 
These trailers are not described in 
the declarations and no extra 
premium is charged. 
2, the following trailers only if they 
are described on the declarations 
page and extra premium is paid: 
a. trailers designed to be pulled 
by a private passenger car or 
a utility vehtcle: 
(1) if designed to carry per-
wnrt\n 
(2) while used with a motor 
vehicle whose use is 
shown as ''commercial" on 
the declarations pace 
(trailers used only tot 
pleasure use are covered 
even if not described and 
no extra premium paid); or 
(3) while used as premises 
for office, store or dis-
play purposes; or 
b. trailers not designed to be 
pulled by a private passenger 
car or a utility vehicle. 
When w* r c f c r *° trailer coverage, insured 
means: 
1. >*»'' 
2, jour spouse: 
y the relatives of the first person 
named in the declarations; 
4, any other person while using 
your car, a newh acquired car or 
a temporary substitute car, if its 
use is within the scope of consent 
of you ox your spouse; and 
5. any other person or organization 
liable for the use of a covered 
nailer "oy one ol tne £oove »* 
sureds* 
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THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A 
TRAILER IS USED WITH A MOTOR VE-
HICLE THAT IS NOT COVERED UNDER 
THE LIABUJIY COVERAGE OF THIS 
POLICY. 
c. The first paragraph of Limits of Liability 
is changed to read: 
Limits of Liability 
The amount of bodily injury liability 
coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability -
Coverage A - Bodily Injury, Each 
Person, Each Accident . Under "Each 
Person" is the amount of coverage for 
all damages due to bodily injury to 
one person. "Bodily injury to one 
person" includes all injury and dam-
ages to others resulting from this bod-
ily injury, and all emotional distress 
resulting from this bodily injury sus-
tained by other persons who do not 
sustain bodily injury. Under "Each 
Accident" is the total amount of cov-
erage, subject to the amount shown 
under "Each Person**, for all damages 
due \o bodily injury lo two or more 
persons in the same accident 
d. Item 1 of If There b Other Liability 
Coverage is changed to read: 
1. Policies Issued by Us to You, 
Your Spouse, or Any Relative 
If two or more vehicle liability 
policies issued by us to you, your 
spouse, or any relative apply to 
the same accident, the total limits 
of liability under all such policies 
shall not exceed that of the policy 
with the highest limit of liability. 
e. Item 3 of If There Is Other Liability 
Coverage is changed to read: 
3. Temporary Substitute Car, 
Non-Owned Car, Trailer 
Subject to items 1 and 2, if a rent* 
porary substitute car, a non-
owned car or a trailer designed 
for use with a private passenger 
car or utility vehicle: 
a. has other vehicle liability 
coverage on it; or 
b. is self-insured under any 
motor vehicle financial re-
sponsibility law, a motor car-
rier law or any similar law, 
then this coverage is excess over 
such insurance or self-insurance. 
However, subject to items I and 2 
above, this policy shall provide 
primary coverage if: 
a. the vehicle is owned by a car 
business; 
b. an insured h operating the 
vehicle; and 
c. the insured is neither a per* 
son engaged in such car 
business nor that person's 
employee or agent 
SECTION U — NO-FAULT — COVER-
AGE P 
a. Item 2, Disability Benefits, of What We 
Pay is changed to read: 
2. Disability Benefits. This is reim-
bursement for 
a, 85% of an insured's loss of; 
(1) $tosi income; or 
(2) earning capacity 
due to that insureds inability to 
work during a period that: 
(1) begins when the loss of gross 
income or earning capacity 
begins; and 
(2) ends either: 
(a) when the insured no 
longer has any loss of 
gross income or earning 
capacity; 
(b) when the insured dies; 
or 
(c) 52 weeks after the loss, 
whichever occurs first 
This benefit is not paid for the 
first three days of disability, un-
less the disability continues for 
longer than two consecutive 
weeks after the date of injury. 
The most we will pay is the 
amount shown in the Schedule for 
your coverage symbol. 
b. services actually rendered or ex-
penses reasonably incurred for 
services the insured would have 
performed for his or her house-
hold except for the injury. These 
services must be performed dur-
ing a period that: 
\\} Y*$vra to* 4»y* *5\ti to 
date of the injury; and 
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(2) ends either: 
(a) when the insured can 
perform these services; 
(b) when the insured dies; 
or 
(c) 365 days after the date 
of the injury, 
whichever occurs First 
If the insured's disability continues 
for more than 14 consecutive days 
after the date of the injury, the pe-
riod begins on the date of the injury. 
The most we pay per day is $20. 
b. Item 2 of the definition of Insured under 
Definitions is changed to read: 
2. any other person: 
a, while occupying your car or 
a newly acquired car with 
the permission of: 
0) you, your spouse, any 
relative', or 
(2) the person driving such 
car with your permis-
sion; or 
b. while a pedestrian, if injured 
in an accident that occurs in 
Utah and involves' your car 
or a newly acquired car. 
c. Item 4 of When Coverage P Does Not 
Apply is changed to read: 
4. WHILE OPERATING OR OC-
CUPYING A MOTORCYCLE; 
d. The following is added to item 1, Decid-
ing Amount, of the provision Settlement 
orLoss: 
An insured is not entitled to attorney 
fees if the insured elects arbitration as 
provided for by this policy. 
SECTION m — UNINSURED MOTOR 
VEHICLE — COVERAGE U AND UN-
DERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE — 
COVERAGE W 
a. The second paragraph under UNIN-
SURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COV-
ERAGE U is changed to read: 
We will pay damages for bodily injury 
an insured is legally entitled to collect 
from the owner or driver of an unut' 
sured motor vehicle. The bodily injury 
must be sustained by an insured and 
caused by accident arising out of die 
operation, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle. 
b» The first paragraph of the definition of 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle is changed to 
read: 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle - means: 
1. a land motor vehicle, the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of which 
is: 
a. not insured or bonded for 
bodily injury liability at the 
time of the accident; or 
b. insured or bonded for bodily 
injury liability at the time of 
the accident; but 
(1) the limits of liability are 
less than the minimum 
limits required by sec-
tion 31A-22-304 of the 
Utah Insurance Laws. 
The minimum required 
limits are $25,006 for 
each person and $50,000 
for each accident; or 
(2) the insuring company 
denies coverage or is or 
becomes insolvent; or 
(3) coverage for an accident 
is disputed by the liabil-
ity insurer for more than 
60 days; or 
2. an unidentified land motor vehi-
cle which was the proximate 
cause of the bodily injury. If the 
unidentified land motor vehicle 
does not strike either the insured 
or the vehicle the insured is oc* 
cupying, the insured must show 
the existence of the other motor 
vehicle by clear and convincing 
evidence, which shall consist of 
more than the insured's testi-
mony. 
c. The second paragraph under UNDERIN-
SURED MOTOR VEHICLE — COV-
ERAGE W is changed to read: 
We will pay damages for bodily injury 
an insured is legally entitled to collect 
from the owner or driver of an under* 
insured motor vehicle. The bodily 
injury must be sustained by an insured 
and caused by accident arising out of 
the operation, maintenance or use of an 
underinsurcd motor vehicle. 
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d. Item 1 of Limits of Liability — Coverage 
V is changed lo read: 
1. The amount of coverage is shown 
on the declarations page under 
"Limits of Liability — U — Each 
Person, Each Accident" Under 
"Each Person" is the amount of 
coverage for all damages due to 
bodily injury lo one person 
"Bodily injury to one person" in-
cludes all injury and damages to 
others resulting from this bodily 
injury, and all emotional distress 
resulting from this bodily injury 
sustained by other persons who 
do not sustain bodily injury. Un-
der "Each Accident" is the total 
amount of coverage, subject to 
the amount shown under "Each 
Person'*, for all damages due to 
bodily inmry to two or more per* 
sons in the same accident. 
e. Item 1 of Limits of Liability — Coverage 
W is changed to read 
1. The amount of coverage is shown 
on the declarations page under 
"Limits of Liability — W — 
Each Person, Each Accident". 
Under "Each Person" is the 
amount of coverage for all dam-
ages due to bodily injury to one 
person. "Bodily injury to one 
person" includes all injury and 
damages to others resulting from 
this boddy injury^ and all emo-
tional distress resulting from this 
bodily injury sustained by other 
persons who do not sustain bodily 
injury. Under "Each Accident" is 
the total amount of coverage, 
subject to the amount shown un-
der "Each Person", for all dam-
ages due to bodily injury to two 
or more persons in the same ac-
cident. 
5. SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COVERAGES 
a Item 2 under COMPREHENSIVE -
COVERAGE D is changed to read 
2 We will pay you for transporta-
tion costs incurred if your car is 
stolen We will pay up to $25 per 
day beginning when you tell us of 
the theft and ending when we of-
fer to pay for the loss 
If the daily incurred transporta-
tion costs are payable under both 
Comprehensive Coverage and 
Car Rental and Travel Expenses 
Coverage, we will pay only under 
the one coverage where you col-
lect the most If payments have 
been made under Car Rental and 
Tiavcl Expenses Coverage and 
such payments have either ex-
hausted the total amount payable 
under Car Rental Expense or re-
duced the total amount payable 
under Car Rental Expense to less 
than $25, then we will pay under 
Comprehensive Coverage 
b The followineisadded to EMERGENCY 
ROAD SERVICE — COVERAGE H: 
5 locksmith services, up to one hour, 
to open your car it your key is lost, 
stolen or locked inside your car. We 
will pay only the cost of labor. 
c. The last paragraph under CAR RENTAL 
EXPENSE — COVERAGE R is 
changed to read; 
If die incurred daily rental charge is pay-
able under both Comprehensive Cover-
age and Car Rental Expense Coverage, 
we will pay only under the one coverage 
whereyoiJ collect the most 
d. The last paragraph of item I under CAR 
RENTAL AND TRAVEL EXPENSES 
— COVERAGE Rl is changed to read 
If the incurred daily rental charge is 
payable under" both Comprehensive 
Coverage and Car Rental and Travel 
Expenses Coverage, we will pay only 
under the one coverage where you 
collect the most. 
e. Item I of If There Is Other Coverage is 
changed to read: 
L Policies Issued by Us to You, 
Your Spouse, or Any Relative 
If two or more vehicle policies is-
sued by us to you, your spouse or 
any rthiHve apply to the same loss 
or occurrence, we will pay under the 
policy with the highest lumL 
I. CONDITIONS 
Item a under 1. Policy Changes is changed lo read 
a. Policy Terms, The terms of this pol-
icy may be changed or waived only 
by 
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{!) an endorsement issued by us; or coverage, we will five you the 
(2) the revision of this policy form to broader coverage without the is-
give broader coverage without an - * u a n c c o f a new policy as of the 
extra charge. If any coverage you d a t e w c m a k c the change effec-
caxry is changed to give broader |1VC' 
Chief Executive Officer 
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6082P AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT 
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain 
the same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different 
effective date is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page. 
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington, 
Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown 
by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed your policy is changed as follows: 
1. The definition of non-owned ear under 
DEFINED WORDS is changed to read: 
Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned, 
registered or leased by: 
1. you, your spouse; 
2. any relative unless at the lime of die 
accident or loss: 
a. the cor currently is or has within the 
last 30 days been insured for liability 
coverage; and 
b* the driver is an insured who docs not 
own or lease the cor; 
3. any other person redding in the same 
household as you, your spouse or any 
relative; or 
4. an employer of you, your spouse or any 
relative. 
Son* owned car does not include a: 
1. rented car while it is used in connection 
with the insured's employment or busi-
ness; or 
2. car which has been operated oriented by 
or in the possession of an insured during 
any pan of each of the last 21 or more 
consecutive days. If the insured is an 
insured under one or more other car poli-
cies issued by us, the 21 day limit is 
increased by an additional 21 days for 
each such additional policy. 
A non-owned car must be a car in the lawful 
possession of the person operating ic 
1 REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S 
DUTIES 
a. The following provision is added to item 4; 
The person making claim also shall answer 
questions under oath when asked by anyone 
we name* as often as we reasonably ask, and 
sign copies of the answers. 
b. Item 4b is changed to read: 
Tut person making claim also shall: 
b. be examined by physicians chosen 
and paid by us as often as we reason-
ably may require. A copy of the 
report will be sent to tit person upon 
written request. The person, or his or 
her legal representative if the person 
is dead or unable to act, shall author* 
ize us to obtain all medical reports 
and records. 
3. SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COVERAGES 
a. The provision titled Limit of liability -
Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is 
changed to read: 
6082P 
Iverson, Joni v. SFMAIC 
IVERSON00000317PROD 
The limit of our liability for loss to prop-
erty or any part of it is the lower of: 
1. die actual cash value; or 
2. the cost of repair or replacement. 
Actual cash value is determined by the 
market value, age and condition at the 
time the loss occurred Any deductible 
amount that applies is then subtracted. 
The cost of repair or replacement is based 
upon one of the following: 
1. the cost of repair or replacement 
agreed upon by you and us; 
2. a competitive bid approved by us; 
or 
3. an estimate written based upon 
the prevailing competitive price. 
The prevailing competitive price 
means prices charged by a 
majority of the repair market in 
the area where the car is to be 
repaired as determined by a sur-
vey made by us, If jroa ask, we 
will identify some facilities that 
will perform the repairs at the 
prevailing competitive price. 
We will include in the estimate 
parts sufficient to restore the 
vehicle to its prc-loss condition. 
You agree with us that such parts 
may include either parts fur* 
rushed by the vehicle's manufac-
turer or parts from other sources 
including non-original equip-
ment manufacturers. 
Any deductible amount that applies is 
then subtracted 
b. The first paragraph under Settlement of Loss 
-Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
is changed to read 
We have the right to settle a Joss with you 
or the owner of die property in one of the 
following ways: 
1. pay the agreed upon actual cash 
value of die property at the time 
of the loss in exchange for the 
damaged property. If the owner 
and we cannot agree on the actual 
cash value, either party may 
demand an appraisal as described 
below. If die owner keeps die 
damaged property, we will 
deduct its value after the lass 
from our payment The damaged 
property cannot be abandoned to 
us; 
Z pay to: 
a. repair die damaged propeny 
or part or 
b. replace the property or part 
If the repair or replacement 
results in betterment, you must 
pay for the amount of betterment; 
or 
3. return the stolen property and pay 
for any damage due to the theft 
Appraisal under item 1 above 
shall be conducted according to 
the following procedure. Each 
party shall select an appraiser. 
These two shall select a third ap-
praiser. The written decision of 
any two appraisers shall be bind-
ing. The cost of the appraiser 
shall be paid by the party who 
hired him or her. The cost of the 
third appraiser and other appraisal 
expenses shall be shared equally 
by both parties. We do not waive 
any of our rights by agreeing to an 
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appraisal. We have the right to 
move the damaged property, at 
our expense, to reduce storage 
costs during the appraisal proc-
ess. 
The Settlement of Loss provision for 
comprehensive and collision coverages 
incorporates the limit of Liability provi-
sion of those coverages. 
c. Trailer Coverage 
Itemsbandc under "A non-owned trailer or 
detachable living quarters unit is one that:" 
are changed to read: 
c. 
has not been used or rented by. or in 
the possession of you, your spouse or 
any relative during any part of each 
of the last 21 or more consecutive 
days. Uyou are insured by one or 
more other car policies issued by us, 
the 21 day limit is increased by an 
additional 21 days for each such 
additional policy; and 
is not rented and used in connection 
with the employment or business of 
you, your spouse or any relative. 
<5sbj<>*SP^«*V9r 
President 
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DECLARATIONS PAGE 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
30019™ AVENUE GrUXLCY, CO 80630 
NAMED INSURED 
44-1379-47 B 
IVERSON, CARTER 0 
5795 N 4900 W 
BEAR RIVER CJTYUT 84301 
POUCYNUKBER
 r 2 4 847W312-44B 
POLICY PERioo MAR-30-94 TO SEP-12-94 
DO NOT PAY PREMIUMS SHOWN ON THIS PAGE. 
SEPARATE STATEMENT ENCLOSED JF AMOUNT DUE. 
DESCRIBED 
VEHICLE 
YEAR MAKE 
cf** uc 
U0DEL BODY STYLE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
SUNBIRD C D t j y im.\KUMP7*xm 
CUSS 
COVERAGES (AS DEFINED IN POLICY 
SYMBOL-PBEMIUU-CCVERAGE NAMEiMITS OF LIABILITY 
w 
$ 62.05 BODILY INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE UABIUTY 
LIMITS OF LIABIUTY-COVERAGE A-BODILY INJURY 
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT 
50,000 100,000 
LIMITS OF LIABIUTY-COVERAGE ^ PROPERTY DAMAGE 
EACH ACCIDENT 
50,000 
NO-FAULT (SEE POLICY SCHEDULE FOR LIMITS.) 
$50 DEDUCTIBLE COMPREHENSIVE 
$100 DEDUCTIBLE COLLISION 
EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE 
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY-U 
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT 
25,000 50,000 
$ £70 UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
LIMITS OF UABIUTY-W 
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT 
10,000 20,000 
P3 
D50 
G100 
H 
U 
$17.82 
$76.63 
$106.27 
$ 2.16 
$ 4.05 
$271.68TOTAL PREMIUM FOR POLICY PERIOD MAR-30-94 TO SEP-12-94 
$301.86 CURRENT 6 MONTH PREMIUM FOR MAR-12-94 TO SEP-12-94 
EXCEPTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS 
FINANCED-FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH NA, PO BOX 8126, WALNUT CREEK, CA 
94596-8126. 
6078FF.1 AMENDMENT OF NO FAULT-COVERAGE P. 
6082P AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT: CHANGES-DEFINED WORDS; INSURED'S DUTIES; 
COVERAGES. 
68B5EE.1 AMENDMENT OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE U AND UNDERINSURED 
MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE W. 
THIS IS YOUR DECLARATIONS PAGE. 
PLEASE ATTACH IT TO YOUR AUTO POLICY BOOKLET. 
AGENT; RON JEPPESEN 
PHONE (801) 257-3940 137947 
YOUR POLICY CONSISTS OF THIS PAGE, ANY ENDORSEMENTS. AND THE POLICY BOOKLET, FORM 9 8 4 4 . 3 
REPLACED" POLICY 7 2 4 8 4 7 9 - 4 4 A 
PLEASE KEEP TOGETHER 
155-4976 
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